A Fine Risk To Be Run?

The Ambiguity of Eros and Teacher Responsibility by Todd, Sharon
SHARON TODD
A FINE RISK TO BE RUN?
THE AMBIGUITY OF EROS AND TEACHER RESPONSIBILITY
ABSTRACT. Teachers are often placed in a space of tension between responding to
students as persons and responding to students through their institutionally-defined roles.
Particularly with respect to eros, which has become increasingly the subject of strict institu-
tional legislation and regulation, teachers have little recourse to a language of responsibility
outside an institutional frame. By studying the significance of communicative ambiguity
for responsibility, this paper explores what is ethically at stake for teachers in erotic forms
of communication. Specifically, it is Levinas’s own ambiguous understanding of the ethical
significance of eros, and what we have to learn from it, that offers a way of reading the place
of eros in responsibility. I conclude my discussion with some thoughts on what a renewed
understanding of responsibility might mean at the personal and institutional levels.
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Communication with the other can be transcendent only
as a dangerous life, a fine risk to be run.
Emmanuel Levinas – Otherwise Than Being Or Beyond
Essence
The idea that eros might constitute part of an ethical response toward an
other is of utmost concern in developing a notion of teacher responsi-
bility, one that can be attentive to the dilemmas facing teachers around
questions of intimacy, closeness and physical contact with their students.
This is particularly so when one considers the climate of moral panic that
surrounds touching and displays of affection, to say nothing of sexual
relationships, between teachers and students in North America today.1
1 I am thinking particularly here of the increasing numbers of policies being put in
place which attempt to limit severely physical contact between teachers and students, and
the attitudes toward human love and sexuality they both reflect and create. It is not, of
course, that policies ought not to be developed to ensure that there are guidelines and
procedures in place to prevent and deal with abuse. However, my concern is that such
policies (including rigid no-touch and sexual harassment policies) create an excessive
atmosphere of fear and mask the nature of responsibility, reducing the latter to a set of
rule-bound behaviours divorced from the actual encounter with another person. Indeed,
the idea for this paper originated out of a set of concerns raised by students I teach who are
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Such a climate often leaves teachers little room for contemplating their
responsibility in ways that recognise their own attentiveness and respon-
siveness to students in the form of love and physical contact, on the one
hand, without becoming mired in institutionally-defined conceptions of
responsibility that rely on obedience to strict codes of behaviour, on the
other. That is, teachers are placed in a seemingly untenable situation with
respect to erotic forms of communication so long as institutions attempt
to regulate their behaviour so severely and to codify eros so rigidly.2 My
concern in this paper is to offer a way of thinking about responsibility that
helps navigate through the tension of what it means to live ethically within
institutions with respect to eros.
To do this requires, it seems to me, a deposition of eros as a stable
category. Here I turn to the work of Emmanuel Levinas whose view of
eros as an ambiguous communicative practice opens up a way for moving
beyond rigid codifications of eros that impoverish teachers’ working rela-
tions. And this is particularly the case since he views communicative
ambiguity as itself central to an ethics of responsibility. More importantly,
however, I find Levinas’s discussions on eros to be especially instructive in
that they themselves display a certain ambiguity. That is, taken as a whole,
Levinas’s work is undecided about the ethical significance of eros, and
his discussions I think are helpful for probing the limits and possibilities
of eros for teacher responsibility. In what follows, I first elaborate on the
importance of communicative ambiguity for ethical responsibility and then
offer a close reading of Levinas’s own ambiguous position with respect to
eros. In doing so, I seek not to simply learn about what Levinas writes on
eros and responsibility in order to apply it to, or impose it on, education.
In that it asks us to attend to the concrete communicative practices through
which responsibility emerges, as opposed to offering prescriptions of what
those practices ought to look like, the very nature of Levinas’s work refuses
such application. Instead, learning from Levinas gives us a way of reading
concrete relations between teachers and students as the basis for responsi-
bility. By way of conclusion, I discuss how actual communicative relations
give definition and substance to teacher responsibility as a lived prac-
tice and consider what implications this has for educational institutions
themselves.
confronting, with despair and exasperation, the disciplining effects such policies have on
their sense of responsibility.
2 For critical discussions that take issue with the debasement of eros and the erotic
in education, see, for example, Alston (1991), Gallop (1997, 1999), Johnson (1997),
McWilliam (1997), Pellegrini (1999), Phelan (1997), and Silin (1995).
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THE FINE RISK OF COMMUNICATIVE AMBIGUITY
Both his attention to alterity and the essentially ambiguous nature of
communication lead Levinas away from a simple humanism whereby the
‘inter-human’ is a relation between already complete subjects who follow
certain rules of engagement in order to be responsible. The Levinasian
emphasis on communication instead means that subjectivity and responsi-
bility reveal themselves only in relation to an other and therefore emerge
from a signifying encounter with absolute difference that cannot be
predicted beforehand. That is, what counts as ethical in Levinas’s thought
is not encapsulated within rule-governed behaviours, ethical codes, or
moral precepts that can be secured through stable significations. Rather,
the ethical lies within the very ambiguity of communication, within that
which slips our cognitive grasp and possession. Ambiguity is not so much
a matter of misunderstanding what is being said (or expressed) as it is a
matter of the impossibility of ever knowing the other through these signi-
fications. For Levinas, communication is inherently ambiguous because it
gestures beyond any stable meaning toward the very otherness of the other
that marks her as radically distinct from myself. And it is this relation to
the other as one of unknowability where the ethical promise – and risk –
of ambiguity lies.
To return to the quote that opened this paper, Levinas does not call
upon us to take any risk, but to take a fine one, to place our selves in danger
when we communicate. Indeed, what could be more dangerous for teachers
than the risk of eros? But is eros a fine risk? Are sensuality, passion and
love qualities of the transcendent communication that Levinas calls for?
And how would such fine risk, understood as transcendence, be deemed
ethically significant in the context of teaching within institutions?
The key word for me is fine. Although Levinas notes that “the word
‘fine’ has not been thought about enough” (Levinas, l998b, p. 120), he
nonetheless offers some guidance. For Levinas, a fine risk would run
the danger of communicative ambiguity, the fineness to be found in the
approach to the other that necessarily lies behind the communication:
“Communication is an adventure of a subjectivity, different from that
which is dominated by the concern to recover itself . . . it will involve
uncertainty” (1998b, p. 120). A fine risk is equated with leading a life that
ventures forth into an unknown (and unknowable) encounter with an other.
What makes a risk fine has to do with a relationship in which the self seeks
a radical openness toward the other and is susceptible to being moved by
the approach of the other.
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But fineness of risk also seems to suggest that there is a fragility, a
delicacy in the openness, as if the relationship were somehow vulnerable
to attack and violence and consequently needed to be protected from harm.
Levinas writes, “these words [fine risk] take on their strong sense when,
instead of only designating the lack of certainty, they express the gratuity
of sacrifice” (1998b, p. 120 – emphasis added). Levinas is suggesting
here that openness in communication is sacrificial in nature, that the self
offers itself for the other in a spontaneous gesture of generosity that is
not self-interested, but is only for the other. In taking a fine risk when
the other approaches, the self is held in an obligation that is marked both
by the ambiguity of communication – the communication that signifies
the approach of the other – and a sacrifice – an offering up of oneself
for the other. For Levinas, sacrifice is understood as a responsibility for
the approach of the other (1998b, p. 120); significantly, the subject in
communication is already a responsible subject. The fineness of risk, then,
has to do with the responsibility inherent in the communicative ambiguity
between self and other. This means that responsibility views communica-
tion neither as reciprocal nor dialogic in character, nor is it a form of speech
amongst equal subjects. Rather, responsibility involves a radical openness
in communication and an attending to the (unknowable) particularity of
the other that lies behind the words spoken, the deeds committed. In short,
responsibility involves transcending what is manifest in speech or gesture.
It is in this sense that transcendence is ethically significant: “there is in
the transcendence involved in language a relationship that is not empirical
speech, but responsibility” (1998b, p. 120). Since responsibility is a gift
born out of the communicative ambiguity between self and other, then
taking a fine risk means opening oneself up to that very ambiguity which
makes each one of us responsible.
Yet, it is precisely in this very communicative ambiguity where the
problem of eros and teaching lies. The extreme censuring of bodily affec-
tion in schools reveals an incapacity to tolerate any ambiguity associated
with such erotic communication. In the rush to prohibit physical contact, it
is the very openness and uncertainty of interpersonal communication that
is seen to be in violation of professional standards of conduct, which are
by definition knowable, certain, and unambiguous in informing us about
how teachers ought to behave. In opening up the possibility that the very
ambiguity of communication allows for each one of us to exceed ourselves,
to work across our differences, to become moved by and learn from others,
Levinas intimates that responsibility is itself caught up in the very ambi-
guities that are all too often erased in the name of such ethical codes. This
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means, then, that such codes often work to undermine the very thing they
are trying to insure.
In undermining the responsibility initially born out of the interpersonal
communication, institutional codes also serve to define erotic communi-
cation as “pedagogical excess,” to borrow Jane Gallop’s (1999) words;
that is, eros becomes a communication that ‘inappropriately’ oversteps the
bounds of how institutions define the pedagogical roles and responsibilities
for members of their communities. These normative roles make it appear
that teachers and students do not regularly participate in an economy of
erotic affect. As both Gallop and Levinas make clear, however, the quality
of human relationality is not reducible to the roles of those involved. Insti-
tutions generally proscribe certain types of relations rather than certain
qualities of relations, which means that eros becomes problematic for
teachers and students. Moreover, the focus on types of relations suggests
that institutions are concerned with defining certain types of communica-
tion, rather than with exploring the quality of communication. The very
ambiguity, the very tentativeness of the communication across the gulf
that separates self and other is not considered. In other words, regulations
are not instituted in ways that acknowledge communicative ambiguity,
nor the transcendent quality of communicative openness. Instead, insti-
tutions are concerned solely with the content of what persons say and
do, not with the quality of relationality these utterances and deeds help
create and sustain. Thus, for example, the love affair between teacher
and student (and I am speaking of consenting adults here) is only ever
judged in terms of how one type of relation (love) excludes and contradicts
another (teaching-learning). If we shift our attention instead to the quality
of the teacher-student relation, then the question becomes to what extent
does this love compromise or enhance the teacher and student as persons?
And with respect to teachers’ unique positions within institutions vis-à-
vis students, how might this love be construed as something other than a
simple violation of professional obligations?
As we have seen, it is the quality of the interpersonal relation that marks
the beginning of responsibility. Insofar as erotic communication exists in
pedagogical contexts, it seems to me that one way of living well within
the ambiguities of the institution is to reconfigure the relationship between
the personal and the institutional, not so as to eradicate the tensions, but
so as to acknowledge the ethical significance of the quality of human
contact which necessarily involves a little risk-taking. For it is through
the possibility of a fine risk that responsibility can be recentred in educa-
tional institutions. The question remains, however, to what degree does
eros participate in the fine risk necessary to responsibility? If responsibility
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entails a radical openness to communicative ambiguity that is nothing short
of transcendent, to what degree can we say that eros is involved in such
transcendence?
DOING THINGS WITH EROS: LEVINASIAN AMBIGUITY
Levinas’s thinking on eros reveals a gradual transformation of eros from a
quality of transcendence to one of non-transcendence. In examining what
is ethically at stake in eros, it is important to explore this transformation
and to consider the shifts in Levinas’s view to see what questions they raise
about the place of eros in teacher responsibility.
A. Eros’s Ethical Potential
In Time and the Other, Levinas invites a consideration of eros that takes on
the characteristics of what he later defines as the ethical, that is, the relation
to the alterity of the other, to the transcendent “mystery” of the other. He
writes,
It is only by showing in what way eros differs from possession and power that I can
acknowledge a communication in eros. It is neither a struggle, nor a fusion, nor a knowl-
edge. One must recognize its exceptional place among relationships. It is a relationship
with alterity, with mystery – that is to say, with the future, with what (in a world where
there is everything) is never there, with what cannot be there, but with the very dimensions
of alterity (1987, p. 88).
As an exceptional relationship, eros is not purely self-interested, nor does
it assume a form with the other based on “grasping,” “possessing,” and
“knowing.” “But there is nothing of all this, or the failure of all this, in
eros. If one could possess, grasp, and know the other, it would not be other.
Possessing, knowing, and grasping are synonyms of power” (1987, p. 90).
Clearly, then, the erotic relation is not a power relation; in fact, Levinas
claims that power is precisely not a definitive feature of erotic life.3 For
Levinas, love is not fusional, it does not seek a unity between two. Eros is
only possible as a relation because there are two. For example, voluptuous-
ness is not a pleasure like other pleasures for it is not solitary (1987, p. 89),
but always involves an other. Love engenders a pathos precisely because it
3 In claiming that power is not a feature of erotic life, I am not suggesting that sexual
relations as practiced never take part in power relations (sado-masochistic practices are
an obvious example). However, I understand Levinas as trying to peel back the layers of
sensibility that contribute to erotic forms of communication. In this sense, a reaching out
toward another cannot be encapsulated within a sociological understanding of power.
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“consists in an insurmountable duality of beings. It is a relationship with
what always slips away” (1987, p. 86).
This slipping away which is part of the communication of eros is
suggestive of the very ambiguity of love, for, like the caress, love cannot
know what it seeks. It is not a conscious intention, but an anticipation of the
future. In this regard, then, given what Levinas later expresses as the fine-
ness of risk out of which responsibility is born, such an anticipatory state
suggests that eros is very much a part of an ethical project of transcend-
ence. Indeed, in the final paragraphs of Time and the Other, Levinas says
as much: “It [temporal transcendence] is the face-to-face without interme-
diary, and is furnished for us in the eros where, in the other’s proximity,
distance is integrally maintained, and whose pathos is made of both this
proximity and this duality” (1987, p. 94). However, there is a curious turn
of events in Levinas’s thinking.
B. Calling Eros into Question
In Totality and Infinity, Levinas develops further his views of love and
eros, and in particular elaborates on his conception of the feminine as
“the contrariety that permits its [the relation’s] terms to remain absolutely
other” (1987, p. 85). This conception of the feminine, while originating in
Time and the Other, becomes intricately related to Levinas’s move to locate
ethics outside the erotic sphere. Thus while the quality of human relation-
ality in an erotic relation would appear to be ethically significant in Time
and the Other, by Totality and Infinity the erotic relation is of a type that
falls short of Levinas’s ethical stance with regard to the face. This is due, in
part, to how Levinas understands the feminine as a non-transcendent term.
Yet, his views on the matter are rather perplexing.
In an interview entitled “Philosophy, Justice, and Love,” Levinas
responds to a question on the difference between Agape and Eros. His
response betrays a profound ambiguity at the heart of his thinking on eros
and the feminine:
I am definitely not a Freudian; consequently I don’t think that Agape comes from Eros.
But I don’t deny that sexuality is also an important philosophical problem; the meaning of
the division of the human into man and woman is not reduced to a biological problem. I
used to think that otherness began in the feminine. That is, in fact, a very strange otherness
. . . I can say no more about it now; I think in any case that Eros is definitely not Agape,
that Agape is neither a derivative nor the extinction of love-Eros. Before Eros there was the
Face; Eros itself is possible only between faces. The problem of Eros is philosophical and
concerns otherness. Thirty years ago I wrote a book called Le temps et l’autre [Time and
the Other] – in which I thought that the feminine was otherness itself; and I do not retract
that, but I have never been a Freudian (1998a, p. 113 – emphasis added).
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Literally framed within his declarations of “not being a Freudian,” Levinas
asserts that he used to think (as if he does no longer) that the feminine was
the locus of otherness, an idea which he nonetheless cannot bring himself
to retract. This non-retractable statement is what leads him, in my view,
to abandon eros as an ethical possibility: eros had been very much part of
the face-to-face relation in Time and the Other, but is in his later works
allocated to secondary status – as he says in this interview, “before Eros
there was the Face.” Taking on primary rather than parallel significance,
the face signals the possibility of transcendence in a way that eros, as it is
always bound to the feminine, can never fully achieve.
However, Levinas is at pains to do something with eros, since his
previous work suggests that eros itself participates in the same quality of
relationship that he attributes to the face-to-face relation: that is, it has the
capacity both to participate in the ambiguity that defines transcendence
and to respect and maintain the absolute duality of the persons involved.
What Levinas begins to work out more thoroughly here is his earlier views
on fecundity and filiality. The possibility of transcendence for eros is now
seen in terms of the fruit it bears, namely the child it issues forth, and its
relation to paternity.4 For Levinas, while it was the ambiguity of the erotic
communication which suggested (if not assured) a reaching toward the
future, a sacrifice of oneself for the other, here it is replaced by a paternal
relation that erases the presence of the feminine.
In yet another way, Levinas reworks his concept of eros as a self-
interested pleasure – and here he begins to look very much like a Freudian.
In Totality and Infinity, it is only through the face-to-face relation, and not
eros, that the alterity of the other can be maintained. His new formulation
depends upon seeing eros as an impulse aimed toward pleasure for the self,
marking a return to the self, a return which he expressly says is not part of
eros in Time and the Other. Now the ambiguity of love has to do with the
pleasure the self receives from the other – which cannot, therefore, assume
ethical relevance. Consider the radical distance from Time and the Other:
If to love is to love the love the Beloved bears me, to love is also to love oneself in love,
and thus to return to oneself. Love does not transcend unequivocably – it is complacent . . .
(1969, p. 266).
4 The specifically heterosexual character of eros hails from both Time and the Other and
Totality and Infinity, and its patriarchal connotations are sustained by Levinas’s attachment
of the feminine to otherness. With respect to paternity, Levinas writes: “Paternity is a
relation with a stranger who while being Other . . . is me, a relation of the I with a self
which yet is not me . . . . In this transcendence the I is not swept away, since the son is not
me; and yet I am my son” (Levinas, 1969, p. 277).
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Levinas is himself unequivocal in suggesting that there is little hope here
for ethics in the complacent shadow of love.
C. Eros and Proximity
A further shift occurs in Levinas’s thinking in Otherwise than Being, where
it is not simply the feminine that is given up, but eros itself. No longer
seeking to ascribe status (secondary or otherwise) to eros, Levinas begins
to reformulate his concepts of erotic communication into less carnal forms
of ethical relationality. In Otherwise than Being, the language of the text
remains laden with erotic imagery, but the erotic relation itself no longer
carries any ethical significance.
Levinas here focuses on the radical openness and passivity that mark
the ethical relation and seeks to develop ethics as the metaphysical condi-
tion of subjectivity itself. Tracing this condition back to a pre-originary
layer of sensibility, Levinas views closeness, vulnerability, and suffering
as closely linked to the possibility of responsibility for the other. Yet,
rather than returning to eros, Levinas now posits proximity as that ‘special
relationship’ once occupied by eros, which is not merely a type of
communication, but is in fact that which makes communication possible.
He writes,
Saying states and thematizes the said, but signifies it to the other, a neighbor, with a signi-
fication that has to be distinguished from that borne by words in the said. This signification
to the other occurs in proximity. Proximity is quite distinct from every other relationship,
and has to be conceived as a responsibility for the other; it might be called humanity, or
subjectivity, or self (1998b, p. 46).
As a signification prior to all significations, proximity to the other is
located not in the words uttered or deeds committed, but in the realm of
sensibility that is not touched by consciousness, intention, or knowledge.
“Proximity, which should be the signification of the sensible, does not
belong to the movement of cognition” (1998b, p. 63); instead, “the signi-
fication proper to the sensible has to be described in terms of enjoyment
and wounding, which are, we will see, the terms of proximity” (1998b,
pp. 62–63).
Proximity, then, is possible because “subjectivity is sensibility,”
because the “subject is of flesh and blood” (1998b, p. 77), and not because
it thinks or speaks. Indeed, Levinas is adamant about what we might call
the ‘erotic’ character of sensibility, claiming that “as soon as sensibility
falls back into contact, it reverts from grasping to being grasped, like in
the ambiguity of the kiss” (1998b, p. 75). Proximity in this regard is not
a self-interested pleasure but a space/time of communication between two
where the approach of the other signals the beginning of subjectivity itself.
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It is not, then, that two subjectivities participate in proximity, as if each
one decides to become closer to the other; rather proximity is prior to
subjectivity itself, inaugurating its very possibility through difference.
The sensibility and physical contact of which Levinas writes would
seem to suggest a return to eros; yet, while metaphorically Levinas is still
very much committed to the caress, the kiss, the touch, they only serve
now to illustrate the metaphysical themes of exposedness, vulnerability,
passivity and openness that characterise proximity and responsibility. Eros,
as Tina Chanter (1995) points out, now relies on signification already being
in place: “There can only be non-signification [for eros] because significa-
tion already exists, or because the order of meaning is already established.
In this sense, eros is always consequent upon ethics” (p. 206). In other
words, rather than being a quality of communication, it is now assuredly a
type. That is, like the face in Totality and Infinity, proximity comes before
eros, even as it is described by Levinas through erotic metaphor. Now,
transcendence through communicative ambiguity, the essence of a fine
risk, is firmly and securely placed inside an ethical sphere which excludes
the erotic.
LEARNING FROM LEVINAS: RETHINKING TEACHER
RESPONSIBILITY, AMBIGUITY AND THE INSTITUTION
In terms of working our way through the ambiguities of teaching in insti-
tutions, the shifts in Levinas’s thinking begs the question, which Levinas
do we listen to? The one that views eros as potentially transcendent? The
one that claims that eros, by virtue of its relation to the feminine, comes up
short of transcendence? The one that views eros as ethically insignificant?
My unsatisfactory answer must be none, or at least none exclusively. For it
is precisely the placing of eros under the sign of ambiguity that is important
for staking out responsibility in the context of teaching in institutions.
What I have been arguing here is the need to listen not only to
what Levinas has said, but to how he says it: the deflections, omissions,
repetitions, and repositionings that comprise, in part, the communicative
ambiguity of which he so eloquently writes. With respect to eros, then,
Levinas can help us think about the ways in which sexuality, love, and
passion are always open-ended communications, that in and of themselves
may or may not ‘be’ ethical – and, moreover, challenges the notion that any
type of communication in and of itself can ever ‘be’ ethical to begin with.
For it is exactly at the point where Levinas renounces eros as a quality
of human relationality, as part of the face-to-face relation with which he
begins his ethical journey, and turns toward a thematisation of eros as a
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type of relation that eros slips its ethical moorings, and becomes something
other than transcendent communication.
In focusing on the quality of human relations, rather than type, I do
not wish to suggest that all manifestations of eros, or even some of them,
including sex between teachers and students, are necessarily ethical or
not. Rather, Levinas teaches us how to think about student and teacher
relationality as a form of communication that cannot know beforehand its
own ethical significance. In riding the rift between the personal and the
institutional, for teachers in particular, there is potential for taking the fine
risk of eros and for charting alternative courses for institutions themselves,
both of which are interdependent to a large degree.
First, in considering the ethical aspects of eros in the person-to-person
relation, what becomes central is to understand responsibility as that which
emerges from an act of communication. In this sense, erotic expressions
as communicative relations are fundamentally intertwined with the possi-
bility of responsibility right from the start. What is important to attend to,
of course, in this responsibility for the other, is the alterity of the person for
whom one signifies. On a simple level this means refraining from reading
or interpreting students’ responses as all of a kind, as purely sympto-
matic of themes we can pull from our arsenal of knowledge, as though
the meaning we exercise upon them is all there is to the story. Rather,
remaining open to otherness is to sustain a relation to mystery that exceeds
the bounds of our understanding. Insofar as it is a quality of relationality,
eros hold hands with our capacity to listen and to be moved by the other
without thinking we have to possess or know her. This requires, as we
have seen, an element of sacrifice in giving up the certainty of our posi-
tion as teacher (the all-knowing subject) and in moving toward the other
in a loving gesture or embrace; and such sacrifice is frequently evident
when teachers respond to students with love and physical closeness in the
face of institutional pressures to act otherwise. Eros, as it participates in
responsibility, may certainly be a source of pleasure for teachers, but in
its ethical possibility, it is not driven by what it can return; rather, what
makes it a responsible response is its openness to an unanticipatable future,
where its signifyingness remains open-ended to the other’s predicament,
as both a student and a person. Thus, when I show love, generosity and
affection, I do so to ensure that further openness and communication are
possible, and that the other is given the space and time to become them-
selves responsive/responsible subjects. This means allowing students the
opportunity to respond to eros in ways that make sense to them, which is
not to say they necessarily reciprocate. Eros in this view is not a shutting
down of communicative opportunities, but can, in its very ambiguity, allow
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for further communication to take place. This is why eros, insofar as it
can be a responsible response, cannot be purely self-interested, for then
it would become a project of fulfilment, a telos, rather than a project of
possibility, of surprise. This communicative understanding of eros gives,
I think, teachers a beginning point to think through their responsibilities
to their students as something more than embodied performances of a
sterile script. It allows them to ask questions of their relationality and
their responsiveness in a way that understands responsibility as something
deeply connected to giving birth to signification. Moreover, it gives them
a language for defending their actions against what at times appear as the
impervious demands of the institution.
Second, in relation to institutions, it would seem on the surface that
Levinas’s eventual insistence on the non-ethical aspects of eros would
support the de-eroticisation of institutional life, at least insofar as that life
ought to promote conditions of responsibility. However, his staking out of
the feminine as a diminished position in order to render eros problematic
with respect to responsibility, allows us a perspective from which to ques-
tion what it is that is being rejected when institutions sanitise teaching of
all erotic possibility. I think that Levinas’s disparagement of the feminine,
his collapsing of the feminine into a carnality (a non-transcendence) that
is unambiguous in its aim toward unity with the other, helps us to read the
ways institutions often make a similar move in erasing the feminine from
having any connection to responsibility (which is a transcendent term).
Positioning expressions of eros as a series of behaviours to be avoided,
leave, as Irigaray (1991) writes, “women without her own specific face”
(p. 113) that is, without the capacity to be responsible for others in the
sphere of the erotic. With respect to teachers, this collapse of the feminine
with an eros that cannot be transcendent, and therefore responsible, affects
both men and women alike, even if not equally. Teachers are caught within
institutional assumptions of responsibility that are often undergirded by an
image of teacher as predator (whereby female students in particular are
perceived as victims) or as mother (whereby love and passion are envel-
oped within an image of safety as opposed to risk). Ironically, perhaps,
alloying femininity to transcendence – and therefore responsibility – would
enable a more careful rendering of eros that would pay attention to how
both men and women (both students and teachers) are not always simply
defined by patriarchal power relations, but may be exploring, however
tentatively, relations that defy that power. Although abuses of eros can
be facilitated by patriarchal attitudes, I think to read all eros as potentially
abusive does little to alter those relations. Rather, understanding femininity
as having a responsible relation to eros perhaps offers a better challenge
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precisely because it calls attention to the quality of relationality where
both women and men are responsible subjects and not merely perpetrators,
victims or mothers. Although for men, particularly those who are teachers
of young children, it might appear that connecting eros to femininity is
precisely what is already in place and therefore least desired. I would
argue, however, that current patriarchal and heteronormative prescriptions
of male expressions of eros function in conjunction with a disparagement
of the feminine. To be clear, I am not saying that eros should be seen as
feminine, but that the feminine should be seen as having a responsible
relation to eros. This would secure, it seems to me, a vision of eros as a
quality of relationality that exceeds the bounds of any codification of it into
a type, and thus would avoid a view of male affection as either emblematic
of molester or ersatz-mother. Thus keeping femininity outside the ethical
sphere short-changes the way both male and female teachers are inscribed
within institutional codes of responsibility.
In my view, institutions cannot secure and implement rules that seek to
erase communicative ambiguity by insisting that erotic relations are all of
a type. Instead, it is precisely the quality of the relation that matters for the
possibility of responsibility itself. In rethinking the institution, which is, of
course, no small task and not one I can take on here, the difficulty lies in
how to institute rules that serve to nourish both interpersonal communica-
tion and the community at the large. Eros, even when taken in its narrowest
sense of sex, might still, I believe, constitute an unintentional reaching out
to an other that is the very marker of responsibility. This is not meant to
suggest that only eros can ‘produce’ ethical moments, merely that ethical
moments potentially lie in all forms of communication which are open,
ambiguous and maintain the alterity of the other. Viewing eros in this
way, then, requires a new understanding of what ethical codes and rules
of conduct for teachers look like. Performing as they do in ambiguous
spaces, such rules are never fully adequate to addressing the fragility of
communication between subjects, and perhaps need to be formulated in
such a way as to call themselves into question, to be themselves ambiguous
enough to ensure that the quality of relationships becomes their raison
d’être. Thus rather than appear as a series of injunctions, institutions might
develop protocols based on a series of questions that help teachers think
about the quality of their relationships to students. By focussing on quality,
rather than type, institutional rules are then able to ask if certain relation-
ships may be harmful or maleficent. This requires, I think, a new way of
writing policies that acknowledges the inescapable ambiguity of eros, and
communication more generally, rather than seeing eros as a fixed relation
in which affection, desire and physical contact are often erased in the name
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of professional responsibility. I do not think that we need to sacrifice eros
in our institutions in order to live well and responsibly – and responsively
– within them. To do so would be, in my view, to turn our backs on that
“ethical adventure of the relationship to the other person” (Levinas, 1987,
p. 33) that makes our lives worth living, both within and outside institutions
themselves. For eros is not necessarily a fine risk, but it can be.
REFERENCES
Alston, K. (1991). Teaching, philosophy, and eros: Love as a relation to truth. Educational
Theory, 41, 385–395.
Chanter, T. (1995). Ethics of eros: Irigaray’s rewriting of the philosophers. New York:
Routledge.
Gallop, J. (1997). Feminist accused of sexual harassment. Durham, NC: Duke University
Press.
Gallop, J. (1999). Resisting reasonableness. Critical Inquiry, 25, 599–609.
Irigaray, L. (1991). Questions to Emmanuel Levinas. In R. Bernasconi & S. Critchley
(Eds), Re-reading Levinas (pp. 109–118). Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press.
Johnson, R. (1997). The ‘no touch’ policy. In J. Tobin (Ed), Making a place for pleasure
in early childhood education (pp. 101–118). New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
Levinas, E. (1969). Totality and infinity: An essay on exteriority (A. Lingis, trans).
Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press.
Levinas, E. (1987). Time and the other and additional essays (R.A. Cohen, trans).
Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press.
Levinas, E. (1998a). Philosophy, justice, and love. In Entre nous: On thinking-of-the-other
(M.B. Smith and B. Harshav, trans) (pp. 103–122). New York: Columbia University
Press.
Levinas, E. (1998b). Otherwise than being or beyond essence (A. Lingis, trans). Pittsburgh:
Duquesne University Press.
McWilliam, E. (1997). Beyond the missionary position: Teacher desire and radical
pedagogy. In S. Todd (Ed), Learning desire: Perspectives on pedagogy, culture, and the
unsaid (pp. 217–236). New York: Routledge.
Pellegrini, A. (1999). Pedagogy’s turn: Observations on students, teachers, and
transference-love. Critical Inquiry, 25, 617–625.
Phelan, A.M. (1997). Classroom management and the erasure of teacher desire. In J. Tobin
(Ed), Making a place for pleasure in early childhood education (pp. 16–100). New
Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
Silin, J.G. (1995). Sex, death, and the education of children: Our passion for ignorance in
the age of aids. New York: Teachers College Press.
Faculty of Education
York University
Toronto, Ontario
M3J 1P3
Canada
